Tomographic Quantum Cryptography by Liang, Yeong Cherng et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
05
01
8v
1 
 5
 M
ay
 2
00
3
Tomographic Quantum Cryptography
Yeong Cherng Liang,1 Dagomir Kaszlikowski,1 Berthold-Georg Englert,1 Leong Chuan Kwek,2, 1 and C. H. Oh1
1Department of Physics, National University of Singapore, 2 Science Drive 3, Singapore 117542
2National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, 1 Nanyang Walk, Singapore 639798
(Dated: 5 May 2003)
We present a protocol for quantum cryptography in which the data obtained for mismatched
bases are used in full for the purpose of quantum state tomography. Eavesdropping on the quantum
channel is seriously impeded by requiring that the outcome of the tomography is consistent with
unbiased noise in the channel. We study the incoherent eavesdropping attacks that are still permis-
sible and establish under which conditions a secure cryptographic key can be generated. The whole
analysis is carried out for channels that transmit quantum systems of any finite dimension.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of quantum cryptography is the distri-
bution of a secure cryptographic key between two parties,
traditionally called Alice and Bob. The key consists of
a truly random sequence of “letters.” The most impor-
tant among the schemes proposed for this purpose—the
BB84 protocol of Bennett and Brassard [1], and Ekert’s
E91 protocol [2]—and all experimentally realized schemes
(Refs. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], in particular, but also others), use
a binary alphabet, i.e., just two letters that are usually
denoted by the numbers 0 and 1. A very readable ac-
count of the state of this art is the recent review article
by Gisin et al. [8].
Binary keys suffice, of course, for all practical pur-
poses and they are relatively easily generated with the
aid of qubits (binary quantum alternatives). In fact, the
selected experiments cited above provide increasing ev-
idence that it may be commercially viable to introduce
feasible quantum cryptographic systems in the near fu-
ture.
The utter simplicity of the kinematics of a qubit,
the most elementary quantum degree of freedom, facil-
itates both the theoretical analysis and the experimen-
tal implementations. And yet, there is a natural curios-
ity about schemes for quantum cryptography that ex-
ploit richer degrees of freedom, especially qutrits (ternary
quantum alternatives, for three-letter keys), and gener-
ally qunits (n-fold quantum alternatives, for n-letter keys
with n = 2, 3, 4, . . . ).
Almost all qunit schemes are generalizations of the fa-
miliar BB84 and E91 qubit protocols [9, 10, 11, 12], and
we deal with a particular generalization of E91 in the
present paper. It is worth mentioning, however, that
there is also at least one higher-dimensional scheme of
quite a different kind, namely the deterministic protocol
of Beige et al. [13], in which four-dimensional systems
(pairs of qubits, for instance) are used for the generation
of a binary key.
The BB84 and E91 protocols are indeterministic be-
cause key letters are only obtained when Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement bases match and, therefore, a sub-
stantial fraction of the data is not used at all (in BB84)
or just for security checks (in E91). In the protocol we an-
alyze here, all measurement results for mismatched bases
are exploited for complete quantum state tomography, by
which Alice and Bob manage to impose very stringent
conditions on the quantum channel and so limit eaves-
dropper Eve’s possibilities substantially.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II the stage
is set by defining the tomographic protocol. Then we
analyze, in Sec. III, what the eavesdropper can do and
achieve, which prepares the subsequent determination of
the security criterion in Sec. IV. We close with a sum-
mary of our results and a critical discussion of some cru-
cial details.
II. THE TOMOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL
We consider a setup of the kind sketched in Fig. 1. A
source emits entangled pairs of qunits to Alice and Bob,
who receive one qunit each of every pair. The qunits dis-
tributed by the source in this manner constitute an ef-
fective quantum channel between Alice and Bob (A&B),
although these two users are not themselves sending any
quantum systems to each other. As a consequence of un-
avoidable imperfections, both in the functioning of the
source and in the transmission line, this quantum chan-
nel will be noisy to some extent, so that A&B will not
receive qunit pairs with the ideal properties they hope
for.
Nevertheless, they will be able to generate a secure
cryptographic key if the noise level is below a certain
threshold. But to be on the safe side, they must de-
termine this threshold level under the assumption that
all imperfections result from their adversary Eve’s inter-
vention, who eavesdrops on the communication between
A&B. In particular, one must grant Eve full control over
the qunit-pair source, and she will try to know as much
about the qunits detected by A&B, as the laws of physics
allow her to know.
After receiving a qunit from the source, Alice measures
a non-degenerate observable that she selects at random
from her set of n + 1 tomographically complete observ-
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FIG. 1: Schematic setup of the key distribution system. Alice
and Bob are connected to each other by an effective quantum
channel, which consists of a source that distributes entangled
qunit pairs. For each qunit, Alice measures one of her tomo-
graphically complete observables, chosen at random when the
qunit arrives. Bob does the same for each of his qunits. They
exchange well chosen information about their measurements
through a classical channel, and conclude then whether or not
the quantum channel has the right characteristics to allow for
the generation of a secure cryptographic key from their raw
data. In their security analysis, Alice and Bob assume that
all imperfections of the quantum channel result from eaves-
dropper Eve’s intervention and, to be on the safe side, they
grant Eve full control of the source.
ables [14, 15]. She keeps a private record of the observ-
ables she measures and of the outcomes of her measure-
ments. Likewise, Bob measures on each of his qunits an
observable randomly chosen from his corresponding set,
and keeps a record of his data as well. We adopt the
notation of [20] and denote by
∣∣mk〉 the kth eigenket of
Alice’s mth observable and by
∣∣mk〉 the kth eigenket of
Bob’s mth observable. The correspondence between the
two sets of observables, or rather between the orthonor-
mal measurement bases they provide, is then established
by requiring that 〈
0j
∣∣mk〉 = 〈mk∣∣0j〉 (1)
holds for j, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and m = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n.
In short, the roles of bras and kets are interchanged.
Ideally, A&B wish to receive from the source the max-
imally entangled two-qunit state
∣∣ψ〉 that is specified by
∣∣ψ〉 = 1√
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣0k0k〉 = 1√
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣1k1k〉 = · · ·
=
1√
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣nknk〉 . (2)
As a consequence of (1), it has the same form regardless
of the pair of observables that is used to define it.
When the transmission is over, A&B announce their
choice of observables, their respective m values, for all
qunits through a public channel. They can then divide
the detected qunit pairs into two groups, one in which
the measurement bases match (both m values are the
same, which happens with a probability of 1/(n + 1) ),
and one in which the bases do not match. In the ab-
sence of noise, the measurement results of the first group
(the respective k values—referred to as nit values) are
perfectly correlated and thus give rise to a cryptographic
key in an alphabet with n letters.
In reality, however, A&B must take into account Eve’s
attempts at eavesdropping and the resulting disturbance
of the quantum channel. As a consequence thereof, the
statistical properties of the detected qunit pairs will not
be correctly described by the pure two-qunit state of (2).
Rather than the projector
∣∣ψ〉〈ψ∣∣, an appropriate statis-
tical operator ρ applies to the qunit pairs emitted by a
non-ideal source.
Since A&B measure tomographically complete sets of
observables on their respective qunits, they can deter-
mine the actual two-qunit state ρ from their measure-
ment results. They exploit all data of the mismatched
bases for this purpose, and some of the matched-bases
data. Ideally, they wish for the projector
∣∣ψ〉〈ψ∣∣ but,
realistically, they expect to find a ρ of the form
ρ = (β0−β1)
∣∣ψ〉〈ψ∣∣+ β1
n
with β0+(n−1)β1 = 1 , (3)
which is what one gets when an imperfect transmission
line admixes unbiased noise to
∣∣ψ〉〈ψ∣∣. The non-negative
parameters β0 and β1 have the following physical signif-
icance: β0 is the probability that Alice and Bob get the
same nit value when the bases match, and β1 is the prob-
ability that Bob gets a particular one of the n− 1 values
that are different from Alice’s nit value.
Formally, ρ is a non-negative operator of unit trace,
and thus permissible as a statistical operator, whenever
0 ≤ β1/β0 ≤ n/(n− 1). But only values in the range
0 ≤ β1
β0
≤ 1 (4)
correspond to an admixture of symmetric noise to
∣∣ψ〉〈ψ∣∣
and, therefore, this is the parameter range of interest.
The limiting values mark the extreme situations of “no
noise at all” (β0 = 1, β1 = 0) and “nothing but noise”
(β0 = β1 = 1/n).
Sources that emit two-qunit states of a kind different
from (3) are not regarded as trustworthy by Alice and
Bob. As the crucial, defining step of the tomographic
protocol, they thus accept the raw key sequence only if
their state tomography confirms that the source emits a
two-qunit state of the form (3). Otherwise, they reject
the data wholly and use a different source.
3III. EAVESDROPPING
A. Choosing the right ancilla states
By imposing this rather stringent requirement, A&B
restrict Eve’s possibilities markedly. Her strategy is to
keep a quantum record of what she sends to A&B by
entangling each qunit pair with an ancilla, and to perform
a judiciously chosen measurement on the ancilla after
carefully weighing the information exchanged by A&B
through the public channel. Quite generally, Eve’s option
is to prepare an entangled pure state of the form
∣∣Ψ〉 = n−1∑
k,l=0
∣∣mkml〉∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 (any m = 0, 1, . . . , n),
(5)
where the
∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉’s are the unnormalized kets of the an-
cilla states attached by Eve (with reference to the mth
pair of A&B’s observables). Since there is no advantage
in generating a mixed state instead, it is sufficient to con-
sider all such pure-state preparations.
Now, the two-qunit state received by A&B is obtained
by tracing
∣∣Ψ〉〈Ψ∣∣ over the ancilla degree of freedom, and
their insistence on getting ρ of (3) implies that Eve must
choose her ancilla states such that they obey〈
E˜
(m)
kl
∣∣E˜(m)k′l′ 〉 = β0 − β1n δklδk′l′ + β1n δkk′δll′
=

β0/n if k = l = k
′ = l′,
β1/n if k = k
′ 6= l = l′,
(β0 − β1)/n if k = l 6= k′ = l′,
0 otherwise.
(6)
The right-hand side does not depend on the m value to
which the ancilla states on the left refer and, therefore,
the mapping
∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 → ∣∣E˜(m′)kl 〉 is unitary. Quite explic-
itly, two different sets of ancilla states are related to each
other by∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 =∑
k′,l′
∣∣E˜(m′)k′l′ 〉〈mk∣∣m′k′〉〈m′l′∣∣ml〉 , (7)
which is an immediate consequence of (5) and (1). As
a check of consistency, one can exploit the completeness
and orthonormality of the single-qunit states
∣∣mk〉 to ver-
ify rather easily that (6) holds for any m value, if it holds
for one of them. In summary, then, it does not matter
which m value Eve chooses in (5).
It is expedient to introduce normalized ancilla states∣∣E(m)kl 〉 in accordance with
k = l :
∣∣E˜(m)kk 〉 = ∣∣E(m)kk 〉√β0/n ,
k 6= l :
∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 = ∣∣E(m)kl 〉√β1/n . (8)
Then
〈
E
(m)
kl
∣∣E(m)k′l′ 〉 =
 1 if k = k
′ and l = l′,
1− β1/β0 if k = l 6= k′ = l′,
0 otherwise,
(9)
and
∣∣Ψ〉 =√β0
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣mkmk〉∣∣E(m)kk 〉
+
√
β1
n
∑
k 6=l
∣∣mkml〉∣∣E(m)kl 〉 (any m = 0, . . . , n).
(10)
As stated in (9), for each m value, the ancilla states∣∣E(m)kl 〉 with k 6= l are orthogonal to each other and or-
thogonal to the ones with k = l. The latter are not
orthogonal among themselves (except when β1 = β0, the
case of pure noise and of very little interest), but rather
have the same inner products for all pairs,
k 6= l : 〈E(m)kk ∣∣E(m)ll 〉 = 1− β1β0 . (11)
The n ancilla states
∣∣E(m)kk 〉 are thus linearly independent,
except when β1 = 0, which is the ideal situation of no
noise at all, that is no eavesdropping [27].
B. Ancilla subspaces
This exception aside, the k = l ancilla states
∣∣E(m)kk 〉
span a n-dimensional subspace that is orthogonal to
the (n2 − n)-dimensional subspace spanned by the k 6= l
states. We refer to them as the first and the second sub-
space, respectively. The subspaces associated with dif-
ferent m values are related to each other by the unitary
transformations of (7).
Eve takes advantage of the structure of these subspaces
in the eavesdropping attack that we now proceed to de-
scribe. We shall deal solely with attacks, in which she
performs measurements on the ancillas one-by-one, com-
monly termed incoherent attacks. By contrast, in a co-
herent attack, she would measure some joint observables
of a few, or perhaps many, ancillas [28]. This limitation
is mainly dictated by the technical difficulties that one
faces when analyzing coherent attacks. We note, how-
ever, that some have argued—notably Cirac and Gisin
[29], and Wang [30]—that coherent attacks are not more
powerful than incoherent attacks, but their arguments re-
fer rather explicitly to protocols of the BB84 type, with
intercept-resend eavesdropping attacks, and are not im-
mediately applicable to our tomographic qunit protocol.
Eve’s incoherent eavesdropping procedure is as follows.
The information exchanged by A&B over the classical
channel identifies those qunit pairs that contribute to the
raw key sequence, the ones for which Alice’s m value is
the same as Bob’s. To find out, as much as she can,
about the nit values that A&B have recorded for each
of these matched qunit pairs, Eve performs a suitably
chosen measurement on the respective ancillas, one at a
time. The statistical operator for one of these ancillas
4is obtained by tracing
∣∣Ψ〉〈Ψ∣∣ over the qunit degrees of
freedom, with the outcome
ρ
(m)
Eve =
β0
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣E(m)kk 〉〈E(m)kk ∣∣+β1n ∑
k 6=l
∣∣E(m)kl 〉〈E(m)kl ∣∣ , (12)
where m identifies the matched pair of bases. The first
summation corresponds to the situation, in which A&B
get the same nit value and the ancilla ends up in the
first subspace, which happens with probability β0. And
the situation of differing nit values, when the final an-
cilla state is in the second subspace, is accounted for by
the second summation, which carries the complementary
weight of (n− 1)β1 = 1− β0.
Since the various ρ
(m)
Eve ’s (m = 0, 1, . . . , n) are unitarily
equivalent, it is sufficiently general to consider just one
m value. For notational simplicity, we leave it implicit
from here on and suppress the m label. Then we have
ρEve = β0ρ
(=) + (1− β0)ρ( 6=) (13)
with
ρ(=) =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣Ekk〉〈Ekk∣∣ (14)
and
ρ( 6=) =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
k 6=l
∣∣Ekl〉〈Ekl∣∣ . (15)
The first of these conditional statistical operators, ρ(=),
applies when A&B have the same nit value and the sec-
ond, ρ( 6=), applies when they don’t. Since ρ(=) and ρ( 6=)
reside in the first and second subspace, respectively, Eve
can discriminate between the two situations unambigu-
ously.
Suppose she thus establishes that different nit values
are the case. Under this circumstance, she performs a
measurement that distinguishes between the k 6= l ancilla
states, which is surely possible because they are mutually
orthogonal. She finds the ancilla in the state with ket∣∣Ekl〉, say, and then knows with certainty that Alice’s nit
value is k, and Bob’s is l (with k 6= l, of course).
By contrast, if Eve establishes that the nit values of
A&B are the same, she cannot find out with certainty
what is this common value because the k = l ancilla
states are not orthogonal to each other, except when the
β1 = β0 limit is reached in (4) and the right-hand side
vanishes in (11).
For β1 < β0, Eve’s attempts in discerning the non-
orthogonal
∣∣Ekk〉 ancilla states in the first subspace are
prone to error. Recalling (11), we note that the inner
product for each pair of them is the same positive num-
ber, just like it is for the vectors pointing from the tip
of a pyramid to the corners at its base. It is known
that the error-minimizing measurement for such “pyra-
mid states” is the so-called square-root measurement (see,
e.g., [31, 32] and the pertinent references therein, in par-
ticular [33] and [34]). Although demonstrating this op-
timality requires a careful argument, it is easy to grasp
the basic idea of a square-root measurement.
C. Square-root measurement
For the following, up to and including (27), we restrict
the discussion to the first subspace. Then the n kets∣∣ekk〉 = 1√
nρ(=)
∣∣Ekk〉 (16)
decompose the identity by construction,∑
k
∣∣ekk〉〈ekk∣∣ = 1, (17)
and thus define a generalized measurement—the square-
root measurement. Now note the eigenvalue equations
(
ρ(=) − r0
)∑
j
∣∣Ejj〉 = 0 , (18a)
(
ρ(=) − r1
)∣∣Ekk〉− 1
n
∑
j
∣∣Ejj〉
 = 0 (18b)
with
r0 = 1− n− 1
n
β1
β0
, r1 =
β1
nβ0
, (19)
so that
r0 + (n− 1)r1 = 1 , r0 − r1 = 1− β1
β0
. (20)
The eigenvalue r0 is nondegenerate, whereas r1 is (n− 1)-
fold, and not n-fold, because the n kets in (18b) have
a vanishing sum. We make use of these eigenvalues in
writing
1√
ρ(=)
=
r0 +
√
r0r1 + r1 − ρ(=)√
r0r1(
√
r0 +
√
r1)
(21)
and then exploit (18) to establish
∣∣ekk〉 = 1√
nr1
∣∣Ekk〉− 1−√r1/r0
n
∑
j
∣∣Ejj〉
 . (22)
The parameters η0 and η1 that appear in the probabil-
ity amplitudes〈
ekk
∣∣Ell〉 = √η0 δkl +√η1(1− δkl) (23)
are crucial, inasmuch as they quantify Eve’s knowledge
about the common nit value of A&B: Upon finding
∣∣ekk〉,
she knows that the actual nit value is k with probability
5η0 and that it is either one of the n− 1 other values with
probability η1. In conjunction with (20), the required
normalization
η0 + (n− 1)η1 = 1 (24)
follows immediately from the explicit expressions
√
η0 =
√
r0 + (n− 1)√r1√
n
,
√
η1 =
√
r0 −√r1√
n
.
(25)
The implied identity
√
η0 −√η1 =
√
β1
β0
(26)
is worth noting.
We close the discussion of the square-root measure-
ment in the first subspace with the observation that Eve’s
reference states
∣∣ekk〉 are orthonormal,〈
ekk
∣∣ell〉 = δkl . (27)
As a consequence, the generalized measurement defined
by the decomposition (17) is in fact a standard von Neu-
mann measurement.
Now returning to the general discussion of the full sta-
tistical operator (13), we summarize Eve’s strategy as
follows. She performs a measurement that distinguishes
the n2 states [35]
∣∣ekl〉 =
{
as given in (22) for k = l,∣∣Ekl〉 for k 6= l, (28)
which are orthonormal. With probability (n − 1)β1 =
1 − β0 she finds a state with k 6= l, and then infers that
Alice’s nit value is k, and Bob’s is l. And when Eve finds
a k = l state, which happens with probability β0, she
knows that A&B have the same nit value and can guess
it right with probability η0, but will guess a particular
one of the n− 1 wrong values with probability η1.
D. Probabilities
In more formal terms, the joint probability that, for
matched bases, Alice gets nit value k, Bob gets l, and
Eve detects
∣∣ek′l′〉 is given by
pkl;k′l′ =
∣∣〈E˜kl∣∣ek′l′〉∣∣2 = β0
n
δklδk′l′
[
(η0 − η1)δkk′ + η1
]
+
β1
n
(1− δkl)δkk′δll′ . (29)
All reduced and conditional probabilities are derived
from this expression by partial summation and normal-
ization. For later reference we note the joint probabilities
for Alice and Bob,
p
(A&B)
kl =
∑
k′,l′
pkl;k′l′ =
1
n
[
(β0 − β1)δkl + β1
]
, (30)
and for Alice and Eve,
p
(A&E)
k;k′l′ =
∑
l
pkl;k′l′ =
β0
n
δk′l′
[
(η0 − η1)δkk′ + η1
]
+
β1
n
δkk′ (1− δk′l′) , (31)
as well as the individual probabilities for Alice and Bob,
p
(A)
k =
∑
l,k′,l′
pkl;k′l′ =
1
n
, p
(B)
l =
∑
k,k′,l′
pkl;k′l′ =
1
n
,
(32)
and for Eve,
p
(E)
k′l′ =
∑
k,l
pkl;k′l′ =
1
n
[
(β0 − β1)δk′l′ + β1
]
. (33)
To get a first rough understanding of the significance
of A&B’s probabilities β0, β1 and Eve’s conditional prob-
abilities η0, η1, consider this scenario. A qunit pair has
been received by A&B and detected with matched bases.
Both Bob and Eve are asked to bet on Alice’s nit value.
Bob’s best strategy is to guess that Alice’s value agrees
with his own, and he guesses right with probability β0,
but he is never sure about Alice’s nit value. Eve, by
contrast, knows Alice’s nit value with certainty when de-
tecting the ancilla in one of the k 6= l states of (28),
and guesses right with probability η0 otherwise. Her to-
tal betting odds are thus 1− β0 + β0η0. The comparison
with Bob’s establishes that, if such bets are performed
frequently,
Bob wins more often if β0 > (n+ 3)β1,
Eve wins more often if β0 < (n+ 3)β1,
and they come out even if β0 = (n+ 3)β1.
(34)
These betting odds are, however, really only a rough mea-
sure of Bob’s and Eve’s knowledge about Alice’s nit value,
because Eve’s information is qualitatively different from
Bob’s. As discussed in the next section, the ratio β1/β0
must be substantially below the 1/(n + 3) threshold of
(34) if A&B want to be able to generate a secure key
from the raw key sequence that these bets are about.
IV. SECURITY CRITERION
A. Csisza´r-Ko¨rner threshold
A more systematic quantitative measure of what Bob
and Eve know about Alice’s nit values is the mutual in-
formation between the respective parties. With the prob-
abilities of (30) and (32), we get
I(A&B) =
∑
k,l
p
(A&B)
kl logn
p
(A&B)
kl
p
(A)
k p
(B)
l
= 1 + β0 logn β0 + (1− β0) logn β1 (35)
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FIG. 2: The difference ν, defined in (37), of the mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob and between Eve and ei-
ther one of them, as a function of β0, for various values of
n. Curves a–e are for n = 2, 3, 5, 10, and 100, respectively.
A secure key can be generated from the raw key sequence if
ν is positive. The threshold value of β0, the point of inter-
section with the ν = 0 line, decreases with increasing n and
approaches β0 =
1
2
for n→∞.
for the mutual information between Alice and Bob,
where, fitting to the n-letter alphabet, the logarithm is
taken to base n. Likewise, the mutual information be-
tween Alice (or Bob) and Eve is given by
I(A&E) =
∑
k,k′,l′
p
(A&E)
k;k′l′ logn
p
(A&E)
k;k′l′
p
(A)
k p
(E)
k′l′
= 1 + β0
[
η0 logn η0 + (1− η0) logn η1
]
.(36)
Their difference
ν ≡ I(A&B)− I(A&E)
= β0 logn β0 + (1 − β0) logn β1
−β0
[
η0 logn η0 + (1− η0) logn η1
]
(37)
is shown in Fig. 2 for n = 2, 3, 5, 10, and 100 over the
β0 range of (4). There, it is a monotonically increasing
function of β0 that grows from ν = −1 for β0 = 1/n to
ν = 1 for β0 = 1. The values of β0, where the sign of
ν changes, are listed in Table I for some n, along with
the corresponding values of nβ1/β0 and the ratio η1/η0
of Eve’s conditional probabilities.
Now, according to the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner (CK) Theo-
rem [36], a secure cryptographic key can be generated
from the raw key sequence, by means of a suitably chosen
error correcting code and classical (one-way) communi-
cation between Alice and Bob, if the mutual information
between Alice and Bob exceeds that between Eve and
either of them. In the present context, this is to say that
the tomographic protocol is secure (under the incoherent
eavesdropping attacks considered) if ν > 0. Moreover, ν
is then the yield of the key generation, in the sense that
TABLE I: Threshold values of some parameters. For the var-
ious n values of the first column, the table reports values of
β0, nβ1/β0, and η1/η0 for which the CK threshold is reached
(ν = 0), or for which the CK yield is 50% (ν = 1
2
). The
limiting values for n→∞ are shown in the last row.
ν = 0 ν = 0.5
n β0 nβ1/β0 η1/η0 β0 nβ1/β0 η1/η0
2 0.8436 0.3707 0.2659 0.9357 0.1373 0.4661
3 0.7733 0.4398 0.2741 0.9050 0.1574 0.4649
4 0.7334 0.4846 0.2790 0.8870 0.1698 0.4641
5 0.7077 0.5163 0.2821 0.8750 0.1785 0.4635
10 0.6503 0.5975 0.2880 0.8468 0.2010 0.4604
30 0.6016 0.6851 0.2887 0.8203 0.2266 0.4532
50 0.5881 0.7146 0.2872 0.8123 0.2358 0.4496
100 0.5747 0.7475 0.2843 0.8040 0.2462 0.4448
∞ 0.5 1 0.25 0.75 0.3333 0.4019
a secure key of length νL can be obtained from a raw
key sequence of length L. This invites to call max
{
0, ν
}
the CK yield. It is positive when β0 is larger than the
threshold values of Table I and vanishes at and below the
threshold.
Any actual implementation of the tomographic proto-
col for quantum key distribution needs a reasonable effi-
ciency. The ν = 0 threshold is then of less interest than,
say, the ν = 12 threshold at which the CK yield reaches
50%. The respective values of β0, nβ1/β0, and η1/η0 are
also listed in Table I.
For sufficiently large n, the threshold values of β0 are
well approximated by
β0 ≈
1 + ν + logn
2
1−ν
2 + logn
1+ν
1−ν
, (38)
which becomes the strikingly simple β0 ≈ 12 (1 + logn 2)
for ν = 0. By comparing with the entries in the second
and fifth columns of Table I, we observe that the error is
1% or less for ν = 0 and n > 4, or ν = 12 and n > 3. For
ν = 0, 0.3, 0.6, and 0.9, we illustrate (38) in Fig. 3.
B. Channel capacities
It is interesting to view the CK security criterion also
from another perspective of information theory. Rather
than mutual information, the relevant notion is then that
of channel capacity.
The generation of the raw key can be regarded as
the outcome of a communication between Alice and Bob
through the effective quantum channel of Fig. 1. By
choosing her observables and measuring them, Alice ef-
fectively prepares the qunits sent to Bob in the states
resulting from the formal procedure of state reduction.
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FIG. 3: Threshold values of β0 for CK yields of 0%, 30%, 60%,
and 90%. As a function of n, with the abscissa linear in log n,
the crosses display the exact values of β0 for which ν = 0
(set a), ν = 0.3 (set b), ν = 0.6 (set c), or ν = 0.9 (set d),
respectively. The solid lines show the corresponding values of
the analytical approximation (38), which is assuredly good for
large n values, but performs remarkably well even for small
ones.
For instance, after Alice has measured her mth observ-
able and found
∣∣mk〉 for her qunit, her reduced statistical
operator for Bob’s qunit is
ρ
(B,m)
k = (β0 − β1)
∣∣mk〉〈mk∣∣ + β1 , (39)
with each k value occurring—or, now, being sent—with
probability 1/n. Upon measuring his mth observable,
Bob gets the nit value k with probability β0 and each of
the n−1 other ones with probability β1, quite consistent,
of course, with the joint probabilities (30).
These projective measurements carried out by Bob can
be interpreted as his attempt to extract the information
encoded by Alice in the states ρ
(B,m)
k , so that, for every
m, a certain quantum channel is thus defined between
Alice and Bob. Since, for a given m, Bob gets all right
nit values with the same probability β0/n, and all wrong
values with the same probability β1/n, we are in fact
dealing with a so-called weakly symmetric channel [37].
For a channel of this kind, transmission at full capacity
is achieved for totally random input, as is the case here.
All m values are equivalent, and the capacity of each
channel, C(A&B) = 1 + β0 logn β0 + (1 − β0) logn β1,
is just equal to the mutual information I(A&B) of (35)
[38]. A similar reasoning applies to the effective ancilla
channel between Alice and Eve that is associated with
Eve’s square root measurement. The capacity C(A&E)
of this channel is also equal to the corresponding mutual
information, I(A&E) of (36).
It follows that the CK threshold criterion for the tomo-
graphic protocol has a simple intuitive meaning: secure
one-way communication is possible if the capacity of the
channel between Alice and Bob is higher than the capac-
ity of the channel between Alice and Eve.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The protocol for quantum key distribution that is de-
scribed and analyzed in this paper differs from other pro-
tocols by the element of complete quantum state tomog-
raphy. For this purpose, Alice and Bob exploit the mea-
surement results they obtain for unmatched bases, rather
than just discarding these data as one does in the BB84
protocol and its various generalizations. The check for a
violation of Bell’s inequality in the E91 protocol amounts
to a partial state tomography and, in this sense, our to-
mographic protocol might be viewed as a refinement and
generalization of the E91 protocol.
In the tomographic protocol, Alice and Bob insist on
the source emitting entangled two-qunit states of a par-
ticular form—only states from a one-parametric family
are in fact regarded as acceptable—and thereby they
limit Eve’s choice of eavesdropping attacks stringently.
Up to unitary equivalence, there is then only one prepa-
ration by Eve of the qunit pairs, entangled with her an-
cilla states, that gives her best knowledge of the raw key
sequence obtained by Alice and Bob. But even with this
optimized eavesdropping attack, Eve does not acquire
enough information to prevent Alice and Bob from gen-
erating a secure key, provided that the two-qunit state
is in the parameter range where the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner the-
orem applies. Alice and Bob find out whether this is
the case when they determine the parameters of the two-
qunit state by state tomography.
But the story does not end here. If the source emits
states outside the parameter regime where an immediate
key generation is possible, Alice and Bob might still be
able to achieve their objective although it seems that Eve
knows too much. They just need to first “distill” a better
raw key, for which purpose they can choose between the
quantum procedure of entanglement distillation [39, 40]
and the classical procedure of advantage distillation [41].
Recent work establishes [42] that both procedures are ap-
plicable if β0 > 2β1 and only then, which is, therefore, the
true threshold condition for the tomographic protocol.
The square-root measurement, on which the present
analysis of Eve’s incoherent attack is based (and also the
analysis in [42]), maximizes Eve’s odds of guessing Alice’s
nit values right but, as noted by Shor [43], it does not
always maximize her information about them. In other
words, it may happen that a (slightly) larger value of the
mutual information between Alice and Eve obtains for
another measurement. The only case on record for which
this is known to occur is, however, a very flat n = 3 pyra-
mid of states, outside the physical parameter range of (4).
Other cases are likely to exist, possibly also for larger n
values and rather tall pyramids. If so, the CK threshold
values would be changed (slightly), but presently there is
no indication that the β0 > 2β1 condition for successful
distillation is affected. These matters are not settled as
yet, systematic investigations are being performed, and
results will be reported in due course.
In protocols of the BB84 type, Alice prepares qunits
8and sends them to Bob, with Eve eavesdropping on the
quantum channel. As discussed in Sec. IVB, one method
of preparation could be to detect one qunit of an entan-
gled pair, thereby reducing the state of the other, which
is on its way to Bob. In the setup of Fig. 1 this would
amount to having, so to say, the source inside Alice’s lab-
oratory. It follows that our analysis has a bearing also
on schemes of the BB84 type. Reversing the argument,
no matter how Alice prepares the qunit sent to Bob, she
can treat her record of it as if it were the result of a
measurement on another qunit, be it real or virtual. Al-
ice and Bob can then treat their joint records as if the
data referred to entangled qunit pairs, and apply the to-
mographic protocol. In effect, this limits Eve’s choice
of eavesdropping attacks on the quantum channel in an
analogous way and, as a consequence, our results are also
applicable to tomographic protocols of this other kind.
In the security analysis of protocols of BB84 type, Eve
is assumed to intercept the qunits in transmission, to use
some cloning device for copying the qunit state with the
fidelity permitted by quantum limitations, and to per-
form eventually a suitable measurement on the quantum
copy. It is in this context of single-qunit protocols that
relations equivalent to (25) were first derived for qutrits
(n = 3) by Bruß and Macchiavello [9, 44], and conjec-
tured to hold for arbitrary n [9, 45]. Also, the β0 > 2β1
threshold condition for both distillation procedures ap-
plies to BB84-type qunit protocols [45, 46]. And for the
question about the optimality of Eve’s square-root mea-
surement in the tomographic protocol, there is an analo-
gous question about the optimal cloning device in single-
qunit protocols. In view of these close interrelations, a
definite answer to one of them will surely teach us a les-
son about the other question, too.
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